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INTRODUCTION
This paper draws together the record of regional law of the sea
from recent regional developments, scholarly studies and recom-
mendations, and the law of the sea debate. It analyzes the different
roles which regional law of the sea might play and has played. It
evaluates the prospects for regional law of the sea in different geo-
graphical areas and speculates about the contributions which re-
gional law of the sea might make to the unfolding legal order of
the oceans.
Regional law of the sea is, as this paper shows, increasingly im-
portant. In one sense, this new importance is a sign of failure, the
failure of the nations and their diplomats to write a new global
maritime order. The on-going law of the sea debate was initiated
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in hopes that coastal States might be forestalled from carving up
the seas for reasons of economic interest and that an international
oceanic authority might be constituted to authoritatively distribute
the wealth of the oceans. But it seems that coastal States will ef-
fectively claim zones of at least 200 miles for at least economic pur-
poses and that there remain great differences among the nations
about the proper nature of any international machinery to govern
the shrinking remainder of the seas. Regional law of the sea is in-
creasingly important because global law of the sea is increasingly
improbable.
But, in another sense, the new significance of regional law of the
sea is a sign of optimism, an optimism based on hopes that regional
maritime orders can avoid some of the worst effects of the legal
chaos feared if unilateral national claims make up the new pattern
of ocean law. Regional law of the sea, however, is not a single
phenomenon. Rather it has developed in three roles as a means to
deal with three sorts of needs. These three roles are examined in
turn: first, regional law of the sea may be a means of promoting
shared legal claims of regional States; second, regional law of the
sea may be a means of providing for the efficient use of regional
waters; third, regional law of the sea may be a means of sharing
ocean resources with regional land-locked or shelf-locked States.
REGIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AS A MEANS OF
PROMOTING SHARED LEGAL CLAIMS
In an uncomplicated way, regional law of the sea may be no more
at times than the coordination and promotion of the legal claims
of nations within a region. For reasons of similar historical back-
ground, shared geographical situations, or mutual political, eco-
nomic, or security concerns, States within a region may be in much
more of an accord with each other than they are with nations out-
side the area. By banding together in making international legal
claims, regional States not only iron out differences among them-
selves for the sake of harmony, but for the purpose of facing the
world together-acting more effectively as a unit.
The region which most traditionally has displayed this first sort
of regional law of the sea is Latin America and its sub-regions. The
most famous regional Latin American law of the sea claim is, of
course, to 200-mile territorial seas. The first regional origin of the
extended territorial waters claim is the Declaration of Panama in
1939, when, at the urging of the United States, the American States
created "a defense zone of 300 miles around the hemisphere with
the 'inherent right' to keep the zone free of any hostile act by non-
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American belligerent nations."1 This concept of a maritime defense
zone was again embodied in 1947 in the Rio Treaty. After the uni-
lateral American claim in 1945 to jurisdiction over the continental
shelf,the Latin American States followed suit with unilateral
claims of their own to the shelf, and, in 1947 by Chile and Peru,
to full sovereignty over 200 miles. The individual Latin American
States argued that the Declaration of Panama demonstrated a
hemispheric consensus favoring extended maritime jurisdictions.2
Individual claims to 200-mile seas were bolstered in 1952 by a sub-
regional claim by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, known as the Santiago
Declaration:
(I) Owing to the geological and biological factors affecting the
existence, conservation and development of the marine fauna and
flora of the waters adjacent to the coasts of the declarant countries,
the former extent of the territorial sea and contiguous zone is insuf-
ficient to permit of the conservation, development and use of those
resources to which the coastal countries are entitled.
(1I) The Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru therefore pro-
claim as a principle of their international maritime policy that each
of them possesses a sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area
of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not
less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast .... 3
As the Declaration of Panama was a regional maritime claim
against the then-participants in the Second World War, so the San-
tiago Declaration was a sub-regional maritime claim against devel-
oped distant-water fishing States, especially the United States. By
standing together, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru hoped to more effec-
tively promote their respective 200-mile claims against the United
States. The decision of these three States to stand -together was
made more explicit in the Lima Declaration of 1954, which provided
for joint co-operation and legal defence:
1. Chile, Ecuador and Peru shall consult with one another for the
purpose of upholding, in law, the principle of their sovereignty over
the maritime zone to a distance of not less than 200 nautical miles
1. Bath, Latin American Claims on Living Resources of the Sea, 27 IN-
TER-AmIucA ECONomiuc ArvFns No. 4, at 61-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Bath].
2. Id. at 59-85.
3. Agreement between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, signed at the First Con-
ference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of
the South Pacific, Santiago, August 18, 1952, A/AC.135/10/Rev. 1, at 11-12
(1968).
2. If any complaints or protests should be addressed to any of the
Parties or if proceedings should be instituted against a Party in a
court of law or in an arbitral tribunal, whether possessing general
or specific jurisdiction, the contracting countries undertake to con-
sult with one another concerning the case to be presented for the
defence and furthermore bind themselves to co-operate fully with
one another in the joint defence.
3. In the event of a violation of the said maritime zone by force,
the State affected shall report the event immediately to the other
Contracting Parties for the purpose of determining what action
should be taken to safeguard the sovereignty which has been vio-
lated .... 4
Now more than twenty years old, this sub-regional claim by
States, the coasts of which make up more than 90 percent of the
Pacific shore of South America, is an excellent demonstration of the
creation of a claim to regional law of the sea for the sake of promot-
ing regional preferences against other States. Although the United
States has never accepted the claim to 200-mile territorial seas,
other American States (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Panama, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua) joined with Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in
the Montevideo Declaration of 1970, which endorsed 200-mile juris-
dictions and declared their "right to establish the limits of their
maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with their geo-
graphical and geological characteristics and with the factors gov-
erning the existence of marine resources and the need for their ra-
tional utilization." 5
Thus, the sub-regional claim of the Pacific South American coun-
tries broadened into a claim of many States within the Latin
American region. Indeed, it may not unreasonably be argued that
all that prevents the principle from becoming one for all the hemis-
phere is the opposition of the United States.6 The declarations of
Santiago, Lima, and Montevideo are attempts, if not to extinguish
the antagonism of the United States, at least to disarm the oppon-
ent by making it clear that action taken against one claimant of-
fends all claimants. Insofar as a non-signatory State like the
United States seeks to minimize the hostility of the signatories, it
will not take forceful measures against the emerging regional con-
sensus. Perhaps one of the reasons why Iceland faced British gun-
boats and Latin America did not face American gunboats is that
Iceland acted alone while the Latin Americans acted together.
4. Agreement supplementary to the Declaration of Sovereignty over the
Maritime Zone of Two Hundred Miles, signed at the Second Conference on
the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South
Pacific, Lima, December 4, 1954, A/AC.135/10/Rev. 1, at 12-13 (1968).
5. Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, A/AC.
138/34, at 2-4 (1971).
6. Bath, supra note 1, at 85.
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Regional legal cooperation to promote shared preferences has been
a frequent occurrence in 'the course of the United Nations law of
the sea debate. Not surprisingly, the Latin Americans have main-
tained their 200-mile claim not only against the United States but
in the international context as well.7 And another region has
joined the Latin Americans in this first category.
Since 1972, the Africans have made a regional claim for an ex-
clusive economic zone. In that year the African States Regional
Seminar on the Law of the Sea at Yaound6 concluded:
(1) The African States have the right to determine the limits of
their jurisdictions over the Seas adjacent to their coasts in accord-
ance with reasonable criteria which particularly take into account
their own geographical, geological, biological and national security
factors.
(2) The Territorial Sea should not extend beyond a limit of 12
nautical miles.
(3) The African States have equally the right to establish beyond
the Territorial Sea an Economic Zone over which they will have
an exclusive jurisdiction for the purpose of control regulation and
national exploitation of the living resources of the Sea and their
reservation for the primary benefit of their peoples and their re-
spective economies, and for the purpose of the prevention and con-
trol of pollution.
The establishment of such a zone shall be without prejudice to
the following freedoms: freedom of navigation, freedom of over-
flight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines....
The Economic Zone embodies all economic resources comprising
both living and non-living resources such as oil, gas and other min-
eral resources.8
The Yaound6 Conclusions were seconded by the Council of Min-
isters, the highest body of the Organization of African Unity, in
its Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea at Addis Ababa
in 1973. The Addis Ababa Declaration also called for exclusive eco-
nomic zones and added that the proper width for such a zone was
200 miles:
That the African States recognize the right of each coastal State
to establish an exclusive economic zone beyond their territorial seas
7. Friedheim & Kadane, Quantitative Content Analysis of the United
Nations Seabed Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study,
24 INT RATIONAL OGAxizATioN 492-93 (1970).
8. African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, Yaound6,
Conclusions of the Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, June 20-30,
1972, A/AC.138/79, reprinted in 12 INV'L LEGAL MATEsALS 210, 212 (1973).
whose limits shall not exceed 200 nautical miles, measured from
the baselines establishing their territorial seas;
That in such zones the coastal States shall exercise permanent sov-
ereignty over all the living and mineral resources and shall manage
the zone without undue interference with the other legitimate uses
of the sea: namely, freedom of navigation, overflight, and laying
of cables and pipelines.9
The African position on a 200-mile exclusive economic zone not
only stands as a good expression of regional law of the sea as a
means of promoting shared regional preferences but is a realistic
compromise between the 200-mile territorial sea claims of the Latin
Americans and the narrow jurisdictional preferences of the de-
veloped countries. It is likely that the pronouncements at Yaound6
and Addis Ababa were meant to serve these two purposes, both
to establish African regional law and to compromise the interna-
tional law of the sea debate. As such, the exclusive economic zone
might be the first law of the sea principle originally adopted on
an African basis which becomes general international law. Much
of the traditional law of the sea can be viewed as the broad adop-
tion of European regional principles and many 19th century modifi-
cations such as the laws of neutrality might be seen as American
regional preferences accepted on a global basis.
Some regions and sub-regions have been less successful than
Latin America and Africa in promoting shared legal claims. In
Asia, for example, where national maritime policies "vary very con-
siderably," there has been very little regional co-operation in pro-
moting joint claims in the law of the sea debate.10 Questions such
as archipelagos might find sub-regional support in South Asia and
the issue of passage through straits has been treated for the Straits
of Malacca by a joint declaration in 1971 by Indonesia and Malaysia
which claimed that the Strait was "no longer an international
waterway."" But, as will be discussed in the following section,
most Asian sub-regions share the discord of the Asian region as
a whole.
REGIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING
FOR THE EFFICIENT USE OF REGIONAL WATERS
Regional law of the sea can be much more than an expression
9. Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa
Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, May 24, 1973, A/AC.138/89,
reprinted in 5 BuLL. PEAcE PRoposALs No. 1, at 31 (1974).
10. Pinto, Problems of Developing States and Their Effects on Decisions
on Law of the Sea, in THE LAW oF E SEA: NEEDS AND INTE Ts oF DEVEL-
oPnTG Cou m s 3, 5 (Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the
Law of the Sea Institute, 1972).
11. Leifer, Continuity and Change in Indonesian Foreign Policy, 60 AsIAN
AFFAms 179 (June 1973).
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of national maritime claims coordinated and promoted regionally.
If the States within a region choose, regional law of the sea can
be a means of providing for the efficient use of regional waters.
In this second category, regional law regulates regional maritime
activities, and, as such, is a form of supra-national law. The advan-
tages of regional supra-national law of the sea are much the same
as the much heralded advantages of international supra-national
law of the sea. Waters regulated regionally as opposed to na-
tionally can be better protected against over-fishing and pollution.
In regional waters it is easier and more efficient to provide for the
exploitation of non-living resources and for the enforcement of le-
gal rules of all sorts. Especially where quite a number of nations
share coasts of the same sea or ocean, regional law of the sea seems
an obvious way to provide for the efficient exploitation and protec-
tion of regional waters.
Perhaps the best known examples of regional co-operation are
the worst examples of how regional maritime governance should
work, i.e., the regional fishery organizations. Of some twenty-three
regional fishery organizations only eight really have any avowed
management functions; only three attempt to divide the catch
among their members; and none attempt to prevent non-members
from fishing as they like.12 Little ventured, little gained; it is not
surprising that the reputation of the fishery organizations is notori-
ou.
The most successful example of regional law of the sea as a means
of providing for the efficient use of regional waters is to be found
in Western Europe. There, the most significant advance has been
made in the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Commun-
ity.13 According to the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the Com-
mon Market:
The Common Market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agri-
cultural products. Agricultural products shall mean the products
of the soil, of stock-breeding and of fisheries. ...
... restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a
Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be
12. Friedheim, International Organizations and the Uses of the Ocean, 9
IERNATioNAL CooPERATIoN 242-51 (Jordan ed. 1972).
13. M. Janis, The Development of European Regional Law of the Sea,
1 OcEAN DEv. & INTL' L.J. 275 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Janis].
progressively abolished in the course of the transitional pe-
riod .... 14
A common market in fisheries and freedom of establishment
means, in rtheory, that the territorial waters of every Member State
should be opened to the fishermen of every other Member State.
In practice, it took the European Community a long time to make
national fishing zones regional fishing waters. Less efficient
French and Italian fishermen were understandably reluctant to
welcome Dutch, German, and Belgian fishing fleets, but in June
1970 the Council of the European Community, the rule-making
body, made equal access Common Market policy.1r And in October
1970, Regulation 2141/70 creating the Common Fisheries Policy was
issued, to come into effect in February, 1971:
(1) With a view to promoting harmonious and balanced develop-
ment of the fishing industry within the general economy and to en-
couraging rational exploitation of the biological resources of the sea
and of inland waters, a common system shall be adopted for fish-
ing in maritime waters, together with specific measures with a view
to appropriate action and the coordination of Member States' struc-
tural policies in this sector.
(2) The system applied by each Member State in respect of fishing
in the maritime waters coming under its sovereignty or within its
jurisdiction must not lead to differences in treatment with regard
to other Member States.
In particular, Member States shall ensure equal conditions of access
to and exploitation of the fishing grounds situated in the waters
referred to in the preceding paragraph, for all fishing vessels flying
the flag of a Member State and registered in a Community terri-
tory...
(5) Where fishing in the Member States' maritime waters as refer-
red to in Article 2 lays certain of their resources open to the risk
of over intensive exploitation, the Council may, acting on a pro-
posal from the Commission under the procedure provided for in Ar-
ticle 43(2) of the Treaty, adopt the necessary conservation mea-
sures.
In particular, these measures may include restrictions relating to
the catching of certain species, to zones, periods, methods and to
fishing tackle.16
Although some 3-mile zones may be protected for national fisher-
men for five years "if that population depends primarily on inshore
fishing,"' 71 the Common Fisheries Policy has largely replaced na-
tional territorial fishing waters with regional territorial fishing wa-
14. European Economic Community, Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community and Connected Documents, Publishing Service of the
European Communities, 1965, at 47, 59.
15. Janis, supra note 13, at 279-81.
16. European Communities Regulation No. 2141/70 of the Council of 20
October 1970 on the establishment of a common structural policy for the
fishing industry, 1 Naw DmECTIONS iN mE LAw OF THE SEA: Documm s
50-51 (Lay, Churchill & Nordquist eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Lay].
17. Id. at 51.
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ters. Not only can the Community take conservation measures as
mentioned in article (5) above, but it is able to restructure the
fishing industry, as it did in 1972 when it encouraged, through in-
centives, Community fishermen to switch from cod fishing to
tuna.1 8 In 1973 the Community considered conservation measures
for Greenland and the Faroes and even proposed extending the 12-
mile fishing limit off those islands.19 If fishing limits are generally
expanded to 200 miles by the Geneva or second Caracas conference,
most of the North Sea, much of the Mediterranean, and a good
part of the north-east Atlantic will become the regional fishery
waters of the European Community.
But there are some important limitations to the regional maritime
organization of Western Europe. Many Western European States
with important fisheries are not included. When the "Six" negoti-
ated entrance for Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy was one of the biggest stumbling blocks and
the three new members gained ten-year transition periods. Norway
rejected the Common Market by a referendum in which opposition
to the Common Fisheries Policy was paramount; the "No" vote in
Norwegian fishing areas ran up to ninety-three per cent. 20 Iceland
and Spain are not members of the Community. Thus, the regional
jurisdiction of the Community does not encompass the entire region.
The other significant limitation to the maritime control of the
European Community is with regard to non-living resources. The
Community did decide in 1970 that continental shelf activities did
fall within the realm of EC regulations.2 1 But there is no effective
Community control of offshore oil or gas exploitation.22 And the
Community, at this time, only seeks to provide for freedom of
movement and establishment, not to govern offshore resources.23
18. EC Fish Priorities: Salt Cod Out; Tuna In, EUROPEAN CoMnumiqTy,
February 1972, No. 153, at 6.
19. Community to Protect Fishing Grounds, EUROPEAN ComMUTY, De-
cember 1973, No. 171, at 4.
20. Janis, supra note 13, at 281.
21. European Economic Community, 3 BULL. or T=E EuRoPrAN ConvrmP-
TiES No. 11, at 48 (1970).
22. McLin, Resources and Authority in the North Atlantic: Part I: The
Evolving Politics and Law of the Sea in Northern Europe, 8 FnmDSTAFF RE-
PORTS No. 5, at 10-11 (1973).
23. Written Question No. 489/73 by Lord O'Hagen to the Commission of
the European Communities, European Communities, 16 OFFICIAL JOURNAL,
April 27, 1974, No. C 49/3, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGALA I iALs 709 (1974).
It is unlikely that any regional maritime policy will effectively con-
trol the shelf until the Community reaches an accord concerning
energy in general.
The Community's record is somewhat brighter concerning pollu-
tion and environmental proteotion. According to a 1973 Declara-
tion, the EC has begun a "Programme of Action on the Environ-
ment," part of which includes control of marine pollution.24 Al-
though it is too early to judge whether the regional organization
will successfully deal with environmental problems, there seem to
be fewer internal disputes about the need and nature of pollution
control than there are about an issue such as energy use and ex-
ploitation.
Outside the Common Market there have been other attempts to
create European regional law of the sea, for example the "Agree-
ment for the Prevention of Broadcasts transmitted from Stations
outside National Territories" in 1965 by the Council of Europe and
the new 1974 Baltic Pollution Convention by the Helsinki Confer-
ence.25 But these other accords are more similar to the coordinat-
ing mechanisms of the first category than they are like the govern-
ing mechanisms of this second category and the European Commun-
ity. It is unlikely that any other European organization, at this
time, can hope to be as effectively supra-national as the European
Community. 26
And the record of regional activities outside of Europe does not
show that there have been successful attempts to use regional law
of the sea to provide for the efficient use of regional waters in other
areas of the world. There have been, however, numerous proposals
and arguments for the establishment of regional maritime com-
munities. For the Caribbean, for example:
The application of the patrimonial sea concept could lead to an im-
portant example in regional cooperation for ocean development if
it were to be applied in a creative way; that is, if the nations sur-
rounding a semi-enclosed sea were to claim jurisdiction over a
24. Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting in the
Council of November 22, 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European
Communities on the Environment, European Communities, 16 OFmciAL
JousNnmA, December 20, 1973, No. C 112, reprinted in 13 INT'L MATERTALS
164 (1974).
25. European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts transmitted
from Stations outside National Territories, Strasbourg, January 22, 1965, in
Lay, supra note 16, at 270-74; and Convention on the Marine Environment
of the Baltic Sea Area, adopted at the Diplomatic Conference on the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, March 18-
22, 1974, in 13 INT'. LE, GAL MATE.Azs 546 (1974).
26. Janis, supra note 13, at 284-88.
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patrimonial sea to a maximum limit of 200 miles, and then create
an organization which would manage the major portion of this area
for the common benefit.27
However, in practice the Caribbean nations have been reluctant
to create an effective regional organization for maritime ques-
tions.28 In their Santo Domingo Declaration of 1972 the Caribbean
States recognized the advantages of regional organization while
committing themselves only to "periodic meetings" and coordina-
tion:
(1) Recognizing the need for the countries in the area to unite
their efforts and adopt a common policy vis-a-vis the problems pe-
culiar to the Caribbean Sea relating mainly to scientific research,
pollution of the marine environment, conservation, safeguarding
and exploitation of the resources of the sea;
(2) Decide to hold periodic meetings, if possible, once a year, of
senior governmental officials, for the purpose of coordinating and
harmonizing national efforts and policies in all aspects of oceanic
space with a view of ensuring maximum utilization of resources
by all the peoples of the region.29
Similarly, in Africa there are many good reasons why some type
of African regional maritime organization should be formed. It
could provide for the sharing of resources with land-locked and
shelf-locked States; it could protect extended territorial zones when
weak States with narrow coastlines might be unable to protect the
zones themselves; it could conduct negotiations with potential re-
source exploiters and secure higher prices; it could settle serious
jurisdictional disputes like that between Gabon and Equatorial
Guinea over the island of Mbanie surrounded by rich oil deposits.
But thus far the Organization of African Unity and the Economic
Commission for Africa have only ventured to coordinate national
policies. There are no signs of effective regional machinery devel-
oping.3
°
And the same good reasons exist for regional machinery in Asia
or in its sub-regions:
27. D. Krieger, A Caribbean Community for Ocean Development, 18
INT'L STUDIES Q. No. 1, at 75-103 (1974).
28. IL Gary Knight, Rapporteur's Report, in Gur AND CAnmBEA MA R-
TuE PROBLEMS 42-49 (Regional Workshop of the Law of the Sea Institute
1972).
29. Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 7, 1972 in Lawy, supra note 16, at
247-49.
30. 1VL Janis, The Development of African Regional Law of the Sea, un-
published paper, at 17-21.
Thus it is simply imperative for the coastal States to realize the
importance of regional arrangements for this area; since one of
them can destroy what will take all of them to restore.8 1
But Asian waters are especially troubled by disputes. South Viet-
nam and China battled over the ownership of the oil-rich Para-
cels.32 The Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans have long quarrelled
about fishing.8 3  Now the same peoples are in serious disagree-
ment about offshore oil rights.3 4 Asia may not soon be witnessing
a growth of regional maritime machinery.
Thus, outside of Western Europe, though there are good reasons
for the emergence of regional law of the sea to provide for the
efficient use of regional waters, there are few hopes that effective
organizations will be forthcoming in the near future. No matter
how great the benefits of regional control, unless regional actors
can settle outstanding political differences it is improbable that ef-
fective regional governments will be formed. It is illustrative that
the only successful regional maritime regime, that in Western
Europe, is the result not of recognition of the inherently good rea-
sons for a regional maritime policy but of a larger process of re-
gional economic integration. It is doubtful that the Common Fish-
eries Policy could have been established without the prior establish-
ment of the Common Market.
This is not to say that regional organizations will not be used
to coordinate national maritime policies. This process, describedl in
one work as the creation of a "framework of demands,",' 5 does not
demand regional governance or a great degree of supra-nationalism.
Rather, the coordination of national maritime policies on a regional
basis needs only a reasonable degree of shared legal preferences
as described in the previous section of this paper. Indeed, if a re-
gional organization were to regularly deal with coordination of na-
tional policies it would largely be no more than the institutionalita-
tion of the "promoting" activities already done by regions on an
ad hoc basis. Besides promoting regional claims against outsiders,
an institutional means of voicing regional preferences could be an
effective way of settling inter-regional disputes. But there is a con-
31. CHooN-Ho PAr, FIsHERIES ISSUES IN THE YELLOW SEA AND THE EAST
CHINA SEA 23 (Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper No. 18, Kingston,
R.I., 1973).
32. N.Y. Times, February 6, 1974, at 3.
33. Park, supra note 31, at 1-23.
34. Gittings, Asian Scramble for Oil, TnE GuARDTAN WEEKLY, August 18,
1973, at 5; N.Y. Times, February 17, 1974, § 4, at 3.
35. Dupuy & Piquemal, National Appropriation of Maritime Areas, In-
stitut du droit de la paix et du developpement, Montpelier Conference, May
25-27, 1972, at 25.
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siderable difference between regional organizations used in this
fashion to coordinate and regional organizations used to provide for
the efficient use of regional waters. In the latter case regional law
of the sea is the result of a regional authority, in the former only
of a regional consensus. A regional authority could not only fulfill
the function of a regional consensus but provide for the efficient
exploitation and environmental protection of regional seas. Al-
though there are signs of regional consensus in several areas, e.g.,
Latin America and Africa, the only signs of regional authority are
in Western Europe.
REGIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AS A MEANS or SHARING REGIONAL
OCEAN RESouRcEs wmi REGIONAL LAND-LOCKED
OR SHELF-LOCKED STATES
A third role which regional law of the sea may play is in help-
ing land-locked and shelf-locked States share in the wealth of the
oceans. This role has received increased attention as a result of
the proceedings of the Caracas Conference. The delegation from
Paraguay spoke for the land-locked States:
Only when they enjoyed equal rights in the economic zones of their
regions beyond the 12-mile limit which should be the maximum
for the new law of the sea, would there be unanimous support for
the new law of the sea.36
The delegation from Uganda demanded "the right to exploit not
only living resources but others as well-including mineral re-
sources, be they manganese, tin, or diamonds."37 Austria asked for
"participation" in the fishing zones of "neighboring coastal
States. ' 38 Nepal believed it should be compensated for its inability
to claim the ocean's non-living resources.3 9 There are twenty-six
major States which are land-locked. Many others, like Zaire and
Iraq, have coastlines much shorter than those of most other coun-
tries. These are the States which will lose the most by the estab-
lishment of 200-mile territorial seas or exclusive economic zones
36. Statement of the Delegate from Paraguay, U.N. Press Release, SEA/
57, at 3 (July 12, 1974).
37. Statement of the Delegate from Uganda, U.N. Press Release, SEA/59,
at 2 (July 15, 1974).
38. Statement of the Delegate from Austria, U.N. Press Release, SEA/57,
at 3 (July 12, 1974).
39. Statement of the Delegate from Nepal, U.N. Press Release, SEA/59,
at 2-3 (July 15, 1974).
in place of the creation of an international oceanic regime over most
of the ocean's resources. Now that it seems increasingly unlikely
that extensive coastal State jurisdictions can be prevented, land-
locked and shelf-locked States are turning to a form of regional
law of the sea to secure a share of ocean wealth.
The area in which developments for regional law of the sea as
a means of sharing resources with land-locked or shelf-locked States
is most pronounced is Africa. This should be no surprise since more
than half of the world's land-locked States are African, fourteen
in all: Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic,
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi, Southern Rhodesia,
Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Altogether, almost one-third
of the African countries have no sea coast; if the resources of the
ocean were divided by length of coastline they would get no share
whatsoever.
The declarations of the African region, more than those for any
other area, present the case for the land-locked States:
The exploitation of the living resources within the economic zone
should be open to all African States both land-locked and near
land-locked, provided that the enterprises of these States desiring
to exploit these resources are effectively controlled by African capi-
tal and personnel.
To be effective, the rights of land-locked States shall be comple-
mented by the right of transit,
These rights shall be embodied in multilateral or regional or bi-
lateral agreements.
40
The African countries recognize, in order that the resources of the
region may benefit all peoples therein, that the land-locked and
other disadvantaged countries are entitled to share in the exploita-
tion of living resources of neighboring economic zones on equal
basis as nationals of coastal States on bases of African solidarity
and under such regional or bilateral agreements as may be worked
out.41
Despite the good record of African pronouncements, there are no
regional laws for sharing ocean resources at the present time. The
problems faced by land-locked and shelf-locked States are many.
Even the relatively generous African declarations provide only for
sharing "living" resources; the coastal States are not at all eager
to distribute the profits from offshore oil, gas, and minerals.
Whether a disadvantaged country seeks living or non-living re-
sources, it will be difficult to determine which coastal State should
give up part of its share to which land-locked or shelf-locked State.
This determination could be better made by a regional authority,
but as the previous section of this paper demonstrated, the pros-
40. Yaound6, supra note 8, at 210-11.
41. Addis Ababa, supra note 9, at 31.
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pects for such an authority in Africa or most places are poor. If
land-locked States are to use only their own capital and personnel,
how will they find either? The coastal African States rely greatly
on foreign capital and training themselves. Altogether, it seems
that rights of use and transit will be of less utility to the disad-
vantaged African States than a simple direct share of the profits
from ocean resources. But such an outright payment is not likely
to be made by the coastal States.
If there are difficulties for African land-locked States, problems
are only greater for disadvantaged States elsewhere. In Latin
America attempts to have the Santo Domingo Conference even ad-
dress the plight of land-locked States were frustrated.42 There are
only two land-locked Latin American States, Bolivia and Paraguay,
and they are relatively less important to their region than the four-
teen land-locked States of Africa. The five land-locked European
States (Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, Czechoslavakia, and
Hungary) and five land-locked Asian States (Afghanistan, Nepal,
Bhutan, Laos, and Mongolia) face the same problems of being se-
verely regionally out-numbered.
Although it is possible that disadvantaged States will reach bi-
lateral or multilateral agreements to share ocean wealth, it is likely
that these will be gained through the normal process of diplomatic
bargaining, that they will have to trade political support or some
other commodity to win a slice of profit from neighboring coastal
States. On a regional basis, only Africa seems to have sufficient
numbers of land-locked and allied States to secure a regional accord
assuring disadvantaged States some portion of the gain from the
extended exclusive economic zones. In Africa on a continent-wide
basis there might be some realistic hope that some provision is made
for non-coastal countries, but even so, it will probably still be up
to bilateral negotiation to determine exactly how great a provision
will be made in each case.
For land-locked and shelf-locked States everywhere, though, a de-
cision at the forthcoming law of the sea conferences to include
rights for them in the economic zones would be of assistance in
the regional negotiations which will almost surely occur. Develop-
ing coastal States, especially, are vulnerable to criticism if, after
claiming economic zones to promote their development, they de-
42. Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea, in Alexander, supra note 28, at 163.
prive the land-locked and shelf-locked States of a reasonable share
of ocean resources. These disadvantaged States, afterall, are on the
whole poorer than their coastal neighbors.
CONCLUSION
The development of regional law of the sea has had three discern-
ible objects: the promotion of shared legal claims, the provision
for the efficient use of regional waters, and the sharing of resources
with disadvantaged regional countries. A different geographical
area has been responsible for the principal development for each
of the three objects. Latin America has seen the most effort to
coordinate and promote a shared legal claim, i.e., the 200-mile ter-
ritorial sea. Western Europe has witnessed the most successful
venture to provide for the efficient use of regional waters, i.e., the
Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community. And Africa
has generated the most advanced proposals for assuring regional
land-locked and shelf-locked States a share of regional maritime re-
sources.
The record for regional law of the sea has been and likely will
remain very spotty. One of the advantages of a regional approach
to maritime problems is that different regions will be able to handle
their law of the sea matters in different ways. That Latin America
is so engaged in promoting regional preferences against the United
States, that Western Europe is developing a regional maritime ma-
chinery, that Africa is so concerned with the predicament of the
land-locked countries, all these are healthy regional variations.
That some areas, especially Asia, are so unable to agree, is indicative
of the region's real divisions.
Regional law of the sea can supplement international law of the
sea if the latter is ever drafted. It is doubtful that one hundred-
fifty nations will be able to ever write a law of the sea treaty
more detailed than that which could be written by two dozen or
more regional States. However far international law goes in better
ordering the oceans, it is likely that regional law, in most regions,
will be able to go further. Not that regional legal solutions are
likely to agree. They are not. As the laws of States vary, so re-
gional laws will vary with regional preferences and so will the na-
ture of regional laws differ. Some geographical areas, perhaps
Western Europe, may evolve a regional law of the sea which is
supra-national and governing. Other areas, perhaps Latin America,
will simply coordinate national maritime policies. Certainly, the
eventual legal nature of the oceans will be confused as a result.
But it will be a good deal less confused than if no regional law
existed to modify national jurisdictions at all.
